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WHEN IS A TRUST PROTECTOR A FIDUCIARY?
RICHARD C. AUSNESS*
The use of trust protectors has become increasingly popular in
the past twenty years. This is largely due to the fact that settlors can
use trust protectors to provide more flexibility in trust management,
especially for long-term trusts. However, the use of trust protectors is
not without some risk.' First of all, the legal status of trust protectors
is not explicitly recognized in some states. Furthermore, even in
those states which do recognize the legality of trust protectors, the
nature and extent of their powers is sometimes not always clear.
Finally, there is the vexing question of whether trust protectors owe
any fiduciary duties, and if so, what the nature of these fiduciary
duties may be. In this Article, I will address a number of issues
relating to the fiduciary duties of trust protectors.
Part I will briefly discuss the origins and legal status of trust
protectors in the United States. Part II will examine the fiduciary
duties of trustees and trust advisors in order to determine whether
any of the fiduciary obligations imposed by law on other trust officers
may be applied to trust protectors as well. In addition, Part II will
consider statutes and case law on the subject in both foreign and
American jurisdictions. Part III will explore the question of fiduciary
duties in more depth and will conclude that the law should impose
* Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968
University of Florida; LL.M. 1973 Yale University. The author would like to thank
Professor Franklin Runge, Faculty Services Librarian, for his help in obtaining foreign
statutes and cases for use in this Article. In addition, the author relied on some of the
material in Kathleen R. Sherby & Justin T. Flach, Trust Protectors: The Role and
Characteristicsof a Third Party Decision Maker (powerpoint presentation), TSUBO3 All-
ABA 1, 4 (July 26, 2012).
1 See John H. Martin, The Dynasty Trust in Ohio:A Short, Rigid, or Uncertain Reign, 43 U.
TOL. L. REv. 53, 57 (2011).
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certain fiduciary duties on trust protectors, such as the duties of good
faith, loyalty, impartiality, and independence. At the same time, it
concludes that settlors should be given the power to modify these
duties through appropriate language in the trust instrument. Finally,
Part IV will suggest several drafting solutions that may reduce some
of the uncertainty about the nature of a trust protector's fiduciary
responsibilities.
I. TRUST PROTECTORS
A. Origins of the Office of Trust Protector
The modern office of trust protector can trace its origins back
to a number of sources. These include: (1) non-trustee functionaries
in England and in a number of Commonwealth countries; (2) similar
individuals and financial institutions associated with offshore and
domestic asset protection trusts; and (3) certain individuals known as
trust advisors in America. For example, in England, trust protectors
have been used in one form or another for many years.2 Trust
protectors are also recognized in a number of Commonwealth
countries, particularly in the Caribbean region. Indeed, as early as
1893, the Bahamas Trustee Act permitted a settlor, to grant to a
person who was not a trustee, the power to influence the actions of a
trustee. In recent years, other jurisdictions have enacted similar
legislation.
However, the term "protector" was first employed in 1989
when the Cook Islands International Trusts Amendment Act
expressly provided for trust "protectors." The statute described the
protector as "the holder of a power which whom invoked is capable of
directing the trustee in matters relating to the trust and in respect of
which matters the trustee has discretion and includes a person who is
the holder of a power of appointment or dismissal of trustees."' Other
Commonwealth jurisdictions subsequently adopted a more expansive
view of the role of the trust protector. For example, the Belize Trusts
Act provides that, in addition to the power to remove and replace a
trustee6, a trust protector may exercise any power "conferred on the
2 See Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2761, 2764 (2006).
3 See generally BAHAMAS TRUSTEE Act § 81 (1893).
4 Richard Lewis, Note, The Foreign Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust as Asset Protection:
Potential for Abuse and Suggestions for Reform, 9 CONN. INs. L.J. 613, 618 (2003).
5 COOK ISLANDS INTERNATIONAL TRUSTS AMENDMENT 1989 § 3(2) (1989), available at
http://www.pacliiorg/ck/legis/numactlitaal989351/index.htmL
6 BELIZE TRUSTS ACT, ch. 202, § 16(2)(a) (2000 rev. ed.), available at http://www.lawyers-
abogados.net/en/Resources/Belize/belize -trusts-act.pdf.
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protector by the terms of the trust."7  Similarly, the laws of both
Anguilla' and Nevis9 authorize the settlor to confer additional powers
on the trust protector. Finally, in the British Virgin Islands, the
Trust Ordinance of 1961 set forth a specific list of powers that may be
conferred on a trust protector.o This provision authorizes a trust
protector to determine the governing law of the trust, change the situs
of the trust, remove trustees, appoint new or additional trustees, add
or exclude trust beneficiaries, or withhold consent to actions of the
trustees."
The recent surge in the popularity of trust protectors in the
United States is largely due to the use of trust protectors in
connection with offshore asset protection trusts.12 An asset protection
trust is a self-settled spendthrift trust that is created to insulate the
settlor's property from the claims of creditors.1 3 Until recently, almost
all American courts held that it was against public policy to allow
settlors to thwart their creditors by making themselves the
beneficiaries of a self-settled spendthrift trust.14 For this reason,
beginning in the 1980s, many U.S. citizens established self-settled
spendthrift trusts, euphemistically referred to as "asset protection
trusts" by practitioners, in foreign countries in order to take
advantage of their debtor-friendly laws." For example, many foreign
jurisdictions made life difficult for mainland creditors by refusing to
recognize orders and judgments from American courts and by
enacting very short statutes of limitation for bringing fraudulent
conveyance claims.' 6 Although laws of this sort attracted their share
of swindlers and deadbeats, they also encouraged many honest
professionals, such as physicians, lawyers, accountants, and
' Id. § 16(2)(b).
8 ANGUILLA TRUSTS ACT, ch T70, § 15(2)(c) (2000 rev. ed.), available at
http://www.fsc.org.ai/PDF/Insurance%2OAct.pdf.
9 NEVIS INTERNATIONAL EXEMPT TRUST ORDINANCE § 9(2) (1994), available at
http://www.inttrust.com/TrustOrdinance.pdf.
10 See B.V.I. TRUSTEE ORDINANCE § 86(2) (1961) (amended 2003).
" Id.
12 See Sterk, supra note 2.
13 See Ritchie W. Taylor, DomesticAsset Protection Trusts: The'Estate Planning Tool of the
Decade"or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 164 (1998).
14 See Karen E. Boxx, Gray's Ghost--A Conversation About the Offshore Trust, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 1195, 1202-03 (2000); see also Christopher M. Reimer, The Undiscovered Country:
Wyoming's Emergence as a Leading Trust Situs Jurisdiction, 11 WYo. L. REV. 165, 168
(2011).
15 Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial Planning
Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 152 (2007).
16 See James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme,
102 CoM. L.J. 138, 143-44 (1997); see also Taylor, supra note 13, at 169-75; see also Lewis,
supra note 4, at 628.
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engineers, to take advantage of the protection they afforded against
American creditors by transferring their assets overseas." Many of
these professionals had legitimate concerns that large malpractice
awards might wipe them out financially. 8
In order to achieve the desired protection against domestic
creditors, the settlor would designate a person or institution who was
beyond the reach of American courts to serve as trustee of the asset
protection trust.19 However, Americans who set up these trusts were
understandably reluctant to give up all control over their assets to a
potentially unreliable foreign trustee. 20  Consequently, settlors were
allowed to appoint trust protectors to safeguard their interests
against possible wrongdoing by foreign trustees.2 These trust
protectors were typically given various powers over the trustee and
the trust, including the power to make distributions from the trust,
change the situs of the trust, and remove the trustee and appoint a
successor trustee.2 2 The settlor could also give the trust protector a
"non-binding" letter of intent or letter of wishes to provide guidance to
the trust protector about how the settlor wanted the trust property to
be administered or distributed.2 3
In 1997, Alaska 24 and Delaware25 became the first states to
enact laws to authorize the creation of domestic asset protection
trusts. 26 A number of other states quickly followed suit.27 A domestic
17 CharlesD. FoxIV & MichaelJ. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty Trusts, 37REALPROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 287, 298 (2002).
18 Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and Eating It
Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 56-57 (1994).
19 See Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors'Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 287, 309 (2002).
20 Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust Protector: A Question of Fiduciary Power.
Should a Trust Protector Be Held to aFiduciary Standard?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 76 (2010).
21 See Donovan W. M. Waters, The Protector: New Wine In Old Bottles?, in TRENDS IN
CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAw, 63-64 (A.J. Oakley ed., 1996).
22 Ausness, supra note 15, at 155.
23 See Denise C. Brown, Caribbean Asset Protection Trust: Here Comes the Sun-Dispelling
the Dark Clouds of Controversy, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 133, 134 (1998).
24 See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2013); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.035-13.36.60 (2013).
25 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-76 (2014).
26 See generally Paul M. Roder, American Asset Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware
Move "Offshore"Trusts Onto the Mainland, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1253, 1267-74 (1999) (for a
discussion of both Alaska and Delaware's statutes regarding domestic asset protection
trusts).
27 See Keith Adam Halpern, Domestic AssetProtection Trusts: What Is Your State of Asset
Protection?, 7 FIA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 139, 140 (2008); Fox & Huft, supra note 17, at 320-38;
Timothy Lee, Alaska on the Asset Protection Trust Map: Not Far Enough for a Regulatory
Advantage, But Too Far for Convenience?, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 149, 168-71 (2012); see
generally RichardW. Nenno, Planning with Domestic Asset-Protection Trusts: Part H, 40
REAL PROP. PROB. TR. J. 477 (2005).
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asset protection trust is similar to an offshore asset protection trust,
but avoids the complications and uncertainties associated with
establishing a trust in a country that may have a foreign language
and a different social culture, political system, legal system, and
28currency. A number of these statutes provide for the appointment of
trust protectors or trust advisors to protect the interests of the
settlor.29 These individuals may have the authority to remove
trustees or veto any distributions from the trust.30
According to some commentators, the modern trust protector
may simply be a version of the traditional office of trust advisor." A
trust advisor is a person who has power to exercise control over a
32trustee. Traditionally, trust advisors supervised the trustee's
investment decisions, but they have exercised broader powers as
well."
B. Current Legal Status of Trust Protectors
Although a majority of states now appear to recognize the
legal status of trust protectors, at least implicitly, the legal landscape
in this area is still sparse and uncertain.3 4 For example, many of the
statutes that purport to recognize the legitimacy of trust protectors
say little about their powers, duties, or the potential status of trust
protectors as fiduciaries. Moreover, there is very little case law so
practitioners in this area must exercise a considerable amount of
caution.
At the present time, twenty-four states, including the District
of Columbia, have adopted the Uniform Trust Code.3 6 Section 808(c)
of the Code permits a trust instrument to "confer upon a trustee or
28 Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 515-16 (2000).
29 See, e.g., ALASKASTAT. § 13.36.370(b)(1) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(8)(c)(1)-
(3) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(7)(b) (West 2013).
30 See, e.g., ALASKASTAT. §13.36.370(b)(1) (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(8)(c)(1)-
(3) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(7)(b) (West 2013).
31 See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Case Against the TrustProtector, 25 PROB. & PROP. 50, 51
(2011).
32 Harvard Law Review Association, Note, Trust Advisors, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1230, 1230
(1965).
33 See John P.C. Duncan & Anita M. Sarafa, Achieve the Promise-and Limit the Risk-of
Multi-Participant Trusts, 36 ACTEC L.J. 769, 781 (2011); Ruce, supra note 20, at 75.
34 See Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 33, at 789.
s See id. at 790.
36 These include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, NewMexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H.
SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 389 (9th ed. 2013).
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other person a power to direct the modification or termination of the
trust."" In addition, a few state statutes provide a comprehensive list
of the powers that trust protectors may legitimately exercise. For
example, the South Dakota statute lists the following twelve powers
that a trust protector may exercise if authorized by the trust
instrument:
(1) [mjodify or amend the trust instrument to achieve
favorable tax status or respond to changes in the
Internal Revenue Code, state law, or the rulings and
regulations thereunder; (2) [i]ncrease or decrease the
interests of any beneficiaries to the trust; (3) [m]odify
the terms of any power of appointment granted by the
trust [with the qualification that a modification or
amendment may not grant a beneficial interest to any
individual or class of individuals not specifically
provided for under the trust instrument]; (4) [r]emove
and appoint a trustee, a fiduciary provided for in the
governing trust instrument, trust advisor, investment
committee member, or distribution committee member;
(5) [t]erminate the trust; (6) [v]eto or direct trust
distributions; (7) [c]hange situs or governing law of the
trust, or both; (8) [a]ppoint a successor trust protector;
(9) [i]nterpret terms of the trust instrument at the
request of the trustee; (10) [a]dvise the trustee on
matters concerning a beneficiary; (11) [a]mend or
modify the trust instrument to take advantage of laws
governing restraints on alienation, distribution of trust
property, or the administration of the trust; and (12)
[p]rovide direction regarding notification of qualified
beneficiaries pursuant to § 55-2-13.38
A Wyoming statute enables settlors to grant many of these
same powers to trust protectors but adds some additional powers,
including the power to: (1) "review and approve the accountings of a
trustee" and (2) "elect for the trust to become a qualified spendthrift
trust."" Of course, these enumerated powers are illustrative rather
than exclusive so settlors may grant additional powers in the trust
instrument.
An analysis of the various powers enumerated in these
statutes suggests that a trust protector can play a number of roles in
the administration of a trust. First, and foremost, the trust protector
3 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) (2000) (amended 2010).
3 S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 55-1B-6 (2013).
3 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710(a)(iv), (xii) (2009).
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can oversee and supervise the activities of the trustee; second, he can
advise the trustee on investment or other matters; third, he can act as
mediator between the trustee and the trust beneficiaries; and fourth,
he can perform certain functions that would ordinarily be performed
by a court, such as modifying the terms of the trust instrument.40 Of
course, trust protectors will seldom exercise all of these powers, but in
theory a trust protector could exercise most or even all of them if the
trust instrument authorized him to do so.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
At common law, a fiduciary relation exists between two
persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice
for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the
relation .4 Fiduciary relationships typically impose some sort of
fiduciary duties on one party. The nature of these fiduciary duties
varies according to the underlying fiduciary relationship. However,
the core principle involved is that one who owes a fiduciary duty to
another must not put his or her interests ahead of the other but must
act for the other's benefit.42  Relationships that are deemed to be
fiduciary in nature include: parent-child, attorney-client, doctor-
patient, guardian-ward, and trustee-beneficiary. 43 Before considering
the fiduciary duties that might be applicable to trust protectors, I
shall examine the fiduciary duties that apply to other fiduciaries such
as trustees and trust advisors.
A. Trustees
Two of the three most important duties of a trustee are loyalty
and prudence in the conduct of trust administration.4 4 There are also
a number subsidiary duties, including the duty to collect and protect
trust property, the duty to earmark trust property, the duty of
impartiality, the duty not to mingle trust funds with the trustee's own
property, the duty to inform and account, the duty to make trust
property productive, and the duty not to delegate.4 5
The duty of loyalty has been called "the essence of the
fiduciary relationship."46 The Uniform Trust Code declares that "[a]
40 See Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Trust Protectors in American Trust Law, 45 REAL
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 319, 329-33 (2010).
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959).
42 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 & cmt.
43 Ruce, supra note 20, at 80.
4 Louise Lark Hill, Fiduciary Duties and Exculpatory Clauses: Clash of the Titans or Cozy
Bedfellows?, 45 U. 1ICH. J.L. REFORM 829, 832 (2012).
45 See generally GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 97-101 (6th ed. 1987).
46 J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 48 (1981).
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trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the
beneficiaries.' 7 This principle prohibits trustees from self-dealing or
engaging in activities that constitute a conflict of interest.48  Self-
dealing includes the purchase of trust property by the trustee,4 9 the
sale of the trustee's property to the trust,5 leasing of trust assets to
51 5the trustee, or the trustee's borrowing of trust funds.5 2 Under the so-
called "no further inquiry" rule, a trustee cannot avoid liability for
self-dealing by claiming to have acted in good faith.53 In such cases,
the self-dealing transaction is regarded as voidable and may be
rescinded at the option of the beneficiaries.5 4 The reason that self-
dealing is prohibited is that the transaction is not an arm's length one
because the trustee is both the buyer and the seller.
The duty of loyalty also requires a trustee to avoid a range of
activities that might result in a conflict of interest.5 For example, a
trustee may not sell stock or other assets owned by the trust to a
company where he is an officer or director,5 6 sell trust property to a
spouse or to close relatives,5 7 or otherwise act in a way that is
potentially contrary to the best interests of the beneficiaries.
Conflicts of interest can take many forms. An example of such a
conflict is illustrated by In re Mergenhagen.9 In that case, the
beneficiaries of two irrevocable family trusts petitioned the surrogate
47 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a); see also Mark S. Poker & Amy S. Kiiskila, Prevention and
Resolution of Trust and Estate Controversies, 33 ACTEC J. 262, 266 (2008).
48 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis ofthe Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 655
(1995).
49 See Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago v. Zarkin, 432 N.E.2d 841, 846 (M. 1982);
Presbyterian Church ofFlemingtonv. Plainfield Trust Co., 52 A.2d 400, 401 (N.J. Ch. 1947);
Marshall v. Carson, 38 N.J. Eq. 250, 256 (1884); Munsey v. Russell Bros., 213 S.W.2d 286,
289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).
50 See generally Marcellus v. First Trust & Dep. Co., 52 N.E.2d 907 (N.Y. 1943); In re
Binder's Estate, 27 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 1940).
51 See Sherman v. Sherman, 751 N.W.2d 168, 173-74 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008); Anderton v.
Patterson, 69 A.2d 87, 89 (Pa. 1949).
52 See In re Estate of Stowell, 595A.2d 1022, 1025 (Me. 1991); Veterans'Admin. v. Hudson's
Estate, 179 A. 836, 838-39 (Md. 1935).
53 See RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (2007) (declaring that in cases of self-
dealing, "it is immaterial that the trustee may be able to show that the action in question
was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were fair, and that no profit
resulted to the trustee"); see also Fulton Natl Bank v. Tate, 363 F.2d 562, 571 (5th Cir.
1966).
54 See Karen E. Boxx, Too Many Tiaras: ConflictingFiduciary Duties in the Family-Owned
Business Context, 49 HOUSTON L. REV. 233, 240-41 (2012).
5 See Karen E. Boxx, Of Punctilios and Paybacks: TheDutyof Loyalty Under the Uniform
Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 279, 282-83 (2002).
56 See In re Estate of Martin, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 41-42 (Ct. App. 1999); Tracy v. Cent.
Trust Co., 192 A. 869, 870 (Pa. 1937).
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(c)(1)-(2) (2000) (amended 2010).
58 See In re Trustees Under Yost's Will, 141 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
59 In re Mergenhagen, 856 N.Y.S.2d 389 (App. Div. 2008).
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court to remove David Mergenhagen as trustee.6 0 When the surrogate
court refused to do so, the petitioners appealed.61  The appellate court
ruled that the trustee should be removed, declaring:
The loyalty of David Mergenhagen to his mother, the
surviving grantor of the trusts, placed him in conflict
with his duty as trustee, as evidenced by his
administration of the trust for his mother's benefit
despite the express language of the trust instrument
prohibiting such conduct. In addition, his open
hostility toward the other beneficiaries directly
conflicts with his duty to the trust where, as here, that
hostility has 'interfere[d] with the proper
administration of the trust.'62
One of the most famous conflict of interest cases, In re Rothko,
concerned a breach of the duty of loyalty by the executors of artist
Mark Rothko's estate.6 ' Rothko's estate consisted of almost 800 of his
paintings.6 4 In his will, Rothko directed his executors to sell the
paintings and use the proceeds to fund the Mark Rothko Foundation,
a charitable corporation. 65  Rothko named three of his friends-
Bernard Reis, Theodoros Stamos, and Morton Levine-as executors
and directors of the Foundation.6 6  The executors agreed to sell
Marlborough A.G. (MAG) 100 paintings for the exceedingly low sum of
$1.8 million.6 7 In addition, they consigned the remaining paintings to
Marlborough Gallery, Inc. (MNY), to be sold over a twelve-year period
61
at a fifty percent commission.
Rothko's children brought suit against the executors and
challenged the validity of the two contracts.69 The court concluded
that both Reis and Stamos had conflicts of interest and voided the
contracts.o Reis was a director, secretary, and treasurer of MNY.n
However, because Reis did not own MNY, he was not guilty of self-
a Id. at 390.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 391 (quoting Matter of Rudin, 789 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (App. Div. 2005)).
63 In re Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
64 Id. at 293.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
61 Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 293.
69 Id. Although the children were not named as beneficiaries in Rothko's will, they were
able to claim a share of his estate under New York's mortmain statute. See Boxx, supra
note 55, at 288.
o Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 296.
n Id. at 294.
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dealing.72  However, his involvement in negotiating the contracts
between Rothko's estate and the two art galleries gave rise to a classic
conflict of interest. In his role as executor, Reis was obligated to
negotiate the best deal for the estate. However, as an officer of MNY,
he was expected to obtain the best terms possible for his employer. In
this case, the court found that Reis put the interests of his employer
over those of the Rothko estate.73
The court found that Stamos also had a conflict of interest.
According to the court, "it was to the advantage of coexecutor Stamos
as a 'not-too-successful artist, financially,' to curry favor with
Marlborough." 4 For this reason, the court concluded, Stamos agreed
to the generous terms that Reis negotiated on behalf of the art
galleries. In other words, like Reis, Stamos put his own interests
ahead of the interests of the Rothko estate.
The duty of prudence imposes an objective duty of care, similar
to the reasonably prudent person standard of tort law, upon trustees
76
with respect to the management and investment of trust property.
According to the Uniform Trust Code, this requires the trustee to
"administer the trust as a prudent person would, by considering the
purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other
circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee
shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution."7 The duty of
prudence arises most often in the area of the trustee's investment
decisions. The principal standard for investing is known as the
"prudent investor rule."78 Section 2 of the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act describes this rule as follows: "A trustee shall invest and manage
trust assets as a prudent investor would, by considering the purposes,
terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the
trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise
reasonable care, skill, and caution."7 Other jurisdictions have
adopted a prudent person rule. This rule is not limited to investment
decisions, but applies to other aspects of trust management as well.o
According to this rule, a trustee may "make such investments . .. as a
72 Id. at 295-96.
n Id. at 296.
7 Rothko, 372 N.E.2d at 294.
7 Id. The court determined that Levine did not have a conflict of interest, but was
nevertheless negligent in not objecting to the conduct of Reis and Stamos. Id.
76 See Langbein, supra note 48, at 656.
n UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 (2000) (amended 2010).
78 See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 644 (1996).
7 UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (1994).
80 J. Alan Nelson, The Prudent Person Rule: A Shield for the Professional Trustee, 45
BAYLOR L. REV. 933, 936 (1993).
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prudent man would make of his own property having in view the
preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the
income to be derived."
The trustees in Estate of Collins82 evidently failed to heed this
dictum. Lamb, a business partner of the settlor, and Millikan, a
lawyer, were named as the trustees of a testamentary trust
established by Collins for the benefit of his widow, children, and
parents.83 However, the trustees lent most of the trust corpus to a
construction company owned by two clients of Millikan. 8 4 The loan
was secured by a second mortgage on certain property owned by the
company. The trustees did not inquire into the creditworthiness of
the company, nor did they have the property appraised.8 ' Had they
done so, they would have discovered that the existing first mortgage
exceeded the value of the property that secured the loan and that
there were a number of foreclosures and lawsuits pending against the
company.87  A year later, the company and its owners declared
bankruptcy and defaulted on the loan. When the trustees sought to
be discharged after having lost the entire trust corpus, the
beneficiaries objected, claiming that the trustees had failed to satisfy
the prudent person standard." The court agreed and surcharged
them for the loss of the trust corpus.90
B. Trust Advisors
A trust advisor has been defined as "a person who has power
to control a trustee in the exercise of some or all of his powers."
Traditionally, trust advisors were principally concerned with
overseeing the trust's investments.92 However, trust advisors can
perform other functions as well, including some that overlap with the
functions performed by trust protectors. 9 3  Judicial decisions
regarding the fiduciary duties of trust advisors are relevant in
determining what the fiduciary duties of trust protectors may be
when they exercise the same sort of power as a trust advisor over a
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227(a) (1959).
82 Estate of Collins, 139 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Ct. App. 1977).
83 Id. at 646.
84 Id. at 647.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Estate of Collins, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 648.
90 Id. at 649.
91 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 32, at 1230.
92 Ruce, supra note 20, at 75.
93 See Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 33, at 781.
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trustee.9 4
Stuart v. Wilmington Trust Co.95 provides an interesting
example of a trust advisor's duty of loyalty. In that case, Elbridge
Stuart established a revocable inter vivos trust in 1934 that named
the Wilmington Trust Company as trustee. The trust agreement
provided for the payment of all income from the trust to Elbridge and,
at his death, a portion of the trust would be transferred to a family
foundation, with the remainder to be divided among three residuary
trusts.97 An annuity funded by income from the three trusts would be
paid to the settlor's son, Elbridge Hadley Stuart, during his lifetime
and, at his death, the income from each of the trusts would be paid to
one of the named grandsons.9 8 Elbridge Hadley Stuart died in 1972
and the beneficial interest in one of the trusts vested in his son,
Dwight Lyman Stuart.99 The trust advisors of this trust were Dwight
Lyman Stuart and Jane Whitman, who were appointed in 1982.0
Shortly thereafter, Dwight petitioned the trustee to invade the
trust corpus in the amount of $4.5 million so that he could purchase a
jet airplane for his personal "benefit."' 1 When the other trust advisor
withheld her consent, the trustee petitioned the chancery court for
instructions.' 0 2  The lower court held that since Dwight was a
fiduciary, he was disqualified by virtue of his self-interest from acting
and voting as a trust advisor when consenting to a discretionary
invasion of the trust principal for his own benefit.'o3 This decision
was upheld on appeal.10 4
C. Trust Protectors
1. Decisions from Foreign Jurisdictions
A number of reported decisions from foreign jurisdictions have
concluded that trust protectors cannot use their powers for their own
benefit (unless the power is deemed to be personal), but must only act
for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries.'0 o The reasoning of these
94 See Bove, supra note 31, at 51.
95 Stuart v. Wilmington Trust Co., 474 A.2d 121 (Del. 1984).
9 Id. at 123.
97 Id.
9 Id.
9 Id.
'oo Stuart, 474 A.2d at 124.
'o' Id. at 122.
102 id.
'0' Id. at 123.
104 Id.
1os See generally Centre Trustees (C.I.) Ltd. & Langry Trust Co. (C.I.) Ltd. v. Pabst, 2009
JLR 202 (Royal Ct. of Jersey 2009); Jurgen Von Knieriem v. Bermuda Trust Co. Ltd. and
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decisions is applicable to American trust protectors as well. The
seminal case in this area is Skeats' Settlement,10 6 which was decided
by the English Chancery Court in 1889. Under the terms of an 1882
marriage settlement, certain property was transferred in trust to
Mary Skeats for life with a gift over to any children of the marriage. 0 7
The settlement also provided that if there were no children, then
Mary would be given a general power of appointment.'o Finally, the
husband, Joseph Skeats, and Mary retained to the power to appoint a
replacement for any trustee who died, retired, resided abroad, or
became incapable of serving as a trustee.'09
In 1889, when Evans and Bennett, two of the original trustees,
decided to retire, Joseph and Mary exercised the power to replace
trustees and named Joseph to be one of the trustees."o Evans and
Bennett were doubtful that Joseph had the power to appoint himself
as successor trustee, even with Mary's consent, and, therefore, refused
to transfer the trust property to the new trustees without court
approval."' Although there was no doubt that the settlor could create
a power in a third party to appoint a successor trustee, it was not
clear whether Joseph could validly exercise that power to appoint
himself as trustee. The court declared that the validity of the
appointment depended on whether the power in question was
fiduciary or not.'12 The court concluded that it depended on whether
the appointer or donee of the power was limited in the way he could
exercise the power."' For example, the donee of the power could not
put the office of trustee up for sale to the highest bidder.' 14 According
to the court:
Suppose, as happens not infrequently, that trustees,
under the terms of the deed of trust, are entitled to
remuneration by way of annual salary or payment.
Could the person who has the power of appointment
put the office of trustee up for sale and sell it to the
best bidder? It is clear that would be entirely
improper. Could he take any remuneration for making
the appointment? In my opinion, certainly not. Why
Grosvenor Trust Co., in 1 OFFSHORE CASES AND MATERIALS 116 (Giles Clarke ed., 1996);
Skeats v. Evans, 42 Ch. D. 522 (1889).
106 See Skeats, 42 Ch. D. 522.
107 Id. at 522.
108 Id.
"0 Id. at 523.
Ilo Id.
"' Skeats, 42 Ch. D. at 524.
" Id. at 526.
113 Id.
114 Id.
2014] 89
QUINNIPIAC PROBATE LAW JOURNAL
not? The answer is that he cannot exercise the power
for his own benefit. Why not again? The answer is
inevitable. Because it is a power which involves a duty
of a fiduciary nature; and I therefore come to the
conclusion, independently of any authority, that the
power is a fiduciary power."'
Since the power to appoint a successor trustee was fiduciary in
nature, the court then considered whether the donee of the power was
necessarily prohibited from appointing himself."'6 Citing the maxim
that "a man should not be judge in his own case," the court concluded
that a donee of a power to appoint could not fairly judge his own
fitness for the position as it would be inconsistent with the donee's
fiduciary obligations to the settlor and the trust beneficiaries to
appoint himself."' Accordingly, the court ruled that Joseph's attempt
to appoint himself as trustee was invalid." 8
Von Knieriem v. Bermuda Trust Co. Ltd. and Grosvenor Trust
Co." 9 (also known as the Star Trusts Case),120 suggests that some, but
not necessarily all, of a trust protector's powers may be fiduciary in
nature. In that case, a trust situated in Bermuda owned a substantial
interest in certain pharmaceutical companies.'121 The trust
instrument authorized the trust protector to appoint or remove
additional trustees.'22 Litigation ensued when the trust protector
removed the original trustee and appointed a new trustee.'2 1 Counsel
for the original trustee argued that the trust protector's powers were
fiduciary in nature and could only be exercised in the best interests of
the beneficiaries as a whole.12 4
The court reviewed the terms of the trust and concluded that
the powers conferred on the trust protector were not expressly stated
to be fiduciary.125 Nevertheless, since the trust specifically provided
that the trust protector could not be a beneficiary of the trust, the
court concluded that he could not exercise the power to remove and
replace the trustee for his own benefit, and, for that reason, the
" Id. at 526.
"' See Skeats, 42 Ch. D. at 527.
117 id.
118 Id.
119 See Jurgen Von Knieriem, supra note 105.
120 See Waters, supra note 21, at 65.
121 Jurgen Von Knieriem, supra note 105, at 118-19.
122 Id. at 119.
123 Id. at 120.
124 See id.
125 Id. at 122.
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powers were of a fiduciary nature.126 After determining that the trust
protector had not exercised the power for his own benefit, it ruled that
the removal of the trustee was valid.'12 7
In Rawcliffe v. Steele,12 8 the trust instrument provided that the
trust protector had to consent to any distributions to the trust
beneficiaries. Since no trust protector had been appointed by the
settlor, the trustee petitioned the High Court of the Isle of Man, the
situs of the trust, to appoint a trust protector.12 9  In response, the
court held that since the trust protector's powers were fiduciary in
nature, the appointment was subject to court supervision.3 o
Centre Trustees (C.L) Ltd. and Langry Trust Co. (C.L) Ltd. v.
Pabst,"' a decision from the Royal Court of the Island of Jersey, also
held that a trust protector was a fiduciary, for at least some purposes.
In Centre, the trustee sought to remove Wilfred Pabst as trust
protector and appointer of a discretionary trust created by his former
business associate.' 2 The trust owned fifty percent of a business
previously operated by the trust protector and the settlor, while the
remaining fifty percent of the business was owned by a trust
established by the trust protector, Pabst.'13  Certain powers of the
trustee, largely those involving distributions and investments of the
trust estate, could only be exercised with the consent of the trust
protector. 3 4 In addition, the trust appointer was given the power to
appoint new or additional trustees and trust protectors.'3 5 Finally,
the trust specifically stated that "no power is vested in the protector
in a fiduciary capacity."
The trust protector, in his individual capacity, made certain
claims against the trust.33 According to the court, this action gave
rise to a clear conflict of interest between Pabst, as the trust protector
and appointer, and the trust.'3 ' The Jersey court noted that the trust
beneficiaries were entitled to have decisions made by the trust
126 See Jurgen Von Knieriem, supra note 105, at 123-24.
127 See id. at 125.
128 Rawcliffe v. Steele, 1993-95 MILR 426 (High Court, Isle of Man); Ruce, supra note 20, at
88.
129 Rawcliffe, 1993-95 MLR at 427.
130 Id. at 513.
131 Centre Trustees (C.I.) Ltd. and Langry Trust Co. (C.I.) Ltd. v. Pabst, 2009 JLR202 (June 2,
2009).
132 Id. at 204.
131 Id. at 202.
134 Id. at 205.
135 id.
136 Centre Trustees, 2009 JLR at 211.
' See id. at 214.
138 Id.
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protector and the trust appointer free of any private interests or
competing duties associated with the office of trust protector or trust
appointer.'3 Therefore, it concluded that Pabst had a duty to resign
as trust protector and trust appointer as soon as he realized that
claims in which he had a personal interest would be made against the
trust.14 0 According to the court, the exercise of Pabst's powers as trust
protector would be inextricably intertwined with his conflict of
interest so that he would be unable to exercise his powers without
considering the benefit to himself.14'
2. Domestic Statutes
Although, section 808 of the Uniform Trust Code (hereinafter
"UTC') does not mention trust protectors by name, a comment to this
provision states that it applies to both trust advisors and trust
protectors. 14 Furthermore, section 808(d) states that "[a] person,
other than a beneficiary, who holds a power to direct is presumptively
a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in good faith with regard to
the purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries."' 3 The
comment to sections 808(b)-(d) of the UTC indicates that these
sections are intended to ratify the use of trust protectors and trust
advisors.14 4 However, the comment also distinguishes between trust
advisors, who have "long been used for certain trustee functions, such
as the power to direct investments or manage a closely-held business,"
and trust protectors, who often are granted greater powers,
"sometimes including the power to amend or terminate the trust." 45
The comment to section 808 also distinguishes between a
power to direct, which is expressly covered by the provisions of the
section, and a veto power.146 The holder of the power to direct is able
to initiate the action and direct the performance of the trustee with
respect to that action.147 In contrast, the holder of a veto power does
not have the power to initiate any action, but is in the position of
simply vetoing action initiated or proposed by the trustee.14 8 The
power to initiate seems to be directly covered by section 808, but the
power to veto may not be. However, the latter power is clearly one
that may be vested in a trust protector. Thus, the question arises as
139 Id.
14o Id.
141 Centre Trustees, 2009 JLR at 214.
142 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt. at 142 (2000) (amended 2010).
143 Id. § 808(d).
'4Id. § 808 cmt. at 142.
145 Id. § 808 cmt. at 142-43.
'4 Id. § 808 cmt. at 143.
147 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt. at 143.
148 Id.
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to whether the Code considers the power to veto actions by the
trustee, as well as other powers that may be exercised by a trust
protector, to also be presumptively fiduciary in nature. Furthermore,
the comment to section 808 declares that the holder of a power "can be
held liable if the holder's conduct constitutes a breach of trust,
whether through action or inaction."1 49 Finally, the comment also
declares that the provisions of section 808 can be altered by the terms
of the trust.so
Other states have also declared trust protectors to be
fiduciaries. For example, the Delaware UTC-based statute originally
provided that persons who had the authority to "direct, consent to or
disapprove a fiduciary's actual or proposed investment decisions,
distribution decisions or other decision of the fiduciary," that is, trust
advisors, were considered to be fiduciaries when exercising such
authority.' 1 The statute was recently amended to add new "trust
protector" provisions, which delineate some of the broader powers that
are commonly given to a protector, including the power to remove and
appoint trustees, modify the trust instrument, and modify, expand or
restrict the terms of a power of appointment.152 Unfortunately, this
provision was added to an existing statute without distinguishing
between the "trust" powers that may be conferred on a trust advisor
and the powers that would generally not be given to a trustee so it is
not clear whether a trust protector would be a fiduciary when
exercising these additional powers. A New Hampshire statute
declares that a trust advisor or trust protector, other than a
beneficiary, is a fiduciary and must act in good faith and in
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests
of the beneficiaries.5 5 This suggests that a trust protector may be
considered to be fiduciary for all purposes.
A recently enacted Illinois statute designates the trust
protector as a "fiduciary of the trust" who is deemed to be "subject to
the same duties and standards applicable to a trustee of a trust"
unless negated by the governing instrument.154 Likewise, a Michigan
law provides that, except in limited circumstances, a "trust protector
is a fiduciary to the extent of the powers, duties and discretions
granted to him or her under the terms of the trust . ." and "shall act
in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the
149 id.
1so Id.
s DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313(a) (2011).
152 Id. § 3313(f)(1)-(3).
153 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1202(a) (2008).
154 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(e) (2013).
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trust and the interests of the beneficiaries."' 5  In addition, a
Wyoming statute provides that trust protectors are fiduciaries to the
extent of their "powers, duties and discretions granted to them under
the terms of the trust."lS6 This statutory language seemingly covers
all functions that a trust protector is authorized to perform. Newly
enacted legislation in Missouri states, somewhat ambiguously, that
while a trust protector acts in a fiduciary capacity, the "trust protector
is not a trustee, and is not liable or accountable as a trustee when
performing or declining to perform the express powers given to the
trust protector in the trust instrument."'"
However, some statutes indicate that trust protectors may not
be fiduciaries unless fiduciary status is imposed upon them in the
trust instrument. For example, an Alaska statute provides that,
subject to the terms of the trust instrument, "a trust protector is not
liable or accountable as a trustee or fiduciary because of an act or
omission of the trust protector taken when performing the function of
a trust protector under the trust instrument."' An Arizona statute
uses similar language, but another provision states that "a person,
other than a beneficiary, who holds a power to direct is presumptively
a fiduciary . .. ."" The apparent conflict between these two statutory
provisions creates an ambiguous situation. An Idaho statute states
that the powers of a trust protector "may, in the best interests of the
trust, be exercised. .. in the sole and absolute discretion of the trust
protector and shall be binding on all other persons." 60 While
indicating that trust advisors with a power to direct or consent to a
fiduciary's investment or distribution decisions are fiduciaries with
respect to such decisions, the Idaho statute does say whether a trust
protector who exercises such powers is a fiduciary as well.
In addition, a South Dakota statute provides that a trust
protector "may not be considered to be acting in a fiduciary capacity
except to the extent the governing instrument provides otherwise."'6 '
The statute also declares "[u]nless the governing instrument provides
otherwise, a trust advisor or trust protector has no greater liability to
any person than would a trustee holding or benefitting from the
rights, powers, privileges, benefits, immunities, or authority provided
or allowed by the governing instrument to such trust advisor or trust
1" MIc. COMP. LAWS § 700.7809(1)(a)-(b) (2010).
156 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-711 (2003).
Mo. REV. STAT. §456.8-808(6)(1) (2012).
ALAsKA STAT. § 13.36.370(d) (2013).
9 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10808(D)(2).
1 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501(6) (2013).
161 S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 55-1B-1 (2011).
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protector."1 62 This statute does differentiate between a trust protector
exercising the authority of an investment trust advisor or a
distribution trust advisor, where the protector would be acting in a
fiduciary capacity, and a trust protector exercising other (i.e. non-
fiduciary) powers.
The UTC and a number of state statutes indicate that trust
protectors are to be considered fiduciaries in the exercise of some or
all of their functions unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.
However, this view is not a universal one. A few statutes take the
opposite position and declare that trust protectors are normally not
fiduciaries.
3. The McLean Case
Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust 6 4 is the only American
case to consider whether a trust protector is subject to any fiduciary
duties. The McLean case involved a special needs trust created for
Robert McLean from the proceeds of his personal injury settlement. 6 1
Under the terms of the trust, the trust protector was given the power
to remove the trustee and to appoint a trustee to replace the removed
trustee or whenever the office of trustee became vacant.'6 6 The trust
further provided that "[t]he Trust Protector's authority hereunder is
conferred in a fiduciary capacity and shall be so exercised," but went
on to declare that "the Trust Protector shall not be liable for any
action taken in good faith."6 7
The Merrill Lynch Trust Company and David Potashnick were
initially appointed to serve as trustees, but both resigned within a
month or so after the creation of the trust.'6 1 Michael Ponder, who
had been appointed as the trust protector, then appointed Patrick
Davis the successor trustee.169 However, within two years after being
appointed, both Davis and Ponder resigned and a new trustee and
trust protector had to be appointed. 70 The successor trustee, after
serving for less than a year, also resigned and McLean's mother was
eventually appointed to serve as a successor trustee.' 1 McLean's
162 Id. § 55-1B-1.1.
163 Id. § 55-1B-1.
164 Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Patrick Davis, P.C., 283 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009).
165 Id. at 789.
166 Id. at 790.
167 Id.
161 Id. at 789.
169 McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 790.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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mother brought suit against Ponder, alleging, inter alia, that the trust
protector had a duty to monitor the actions of the trustee to see
whether he was properly administering the trust.17 2 The plaintiff also
claimed that the trust protector had a duty to remove the trustee if he
concluded that the trustee was not properly administering the
trust.' 3"
In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of the suit against
Ponder, the standard on appeal required the appellate court to review
the record in the light most favorable to the appellant, resolving all
factual disputes in her favor as if the allegations were true.17 4 The
record on appeal consisted of the allegations in the petition, together
with a copy of the trust, a very brief statement of uncontroverted
facts, and a couple of affidavits.'" The issue before the appellate
court was whether there was an adequately pled breach of fiduciary
duty claim before the court.'7 6 In other words, had Ponder presented
in his statement of uncontroverted facts and affidavits any
uncontroverted facts that would negate any one of the four elements
of such a claim? 77 Ponder argued that he had negated two of the four
elements: (1) whether the trust protector had a duty to monitor or
supervise the trustees and (2) whether his failure to do so resulted in
a financial loss to the trust. 7 1
The appeal was held before a three-judge panel and each judge
wrote a separate opinion.'79  They agreed only that the summary
judgment was not appropriate because the allegations in the petition,
which were disputed by Ponder, created an issue of fact and Ponder
might be liable if McLean were able to prove his version of the facts. so
Judge Burrell observed that the trust agreement appointed Ponder to
serve "in a 'fiduciary capacit .' and provided limited liability "for
actions taken in bad faith." ' He also ruled that there were
"significant and contested issue[s] of material fact" regarding whom
the trust protector was to act in a fiduciary capacity for-the trust,
172 Id. at 790-91.
173 The plaintiff originally filed suit against all of the prior trustees and trust protectors.
However, afterthe suit was filed, the trial court granted a motion to dismiss and a motion
for summary judgment made by Ponder, the original trust protector. After Ponder's
dismissal from the case, the remaining defendants apparently settled, leaving Ponder as the
sole remaining defendant on appeal. Id. at 792.
174 McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 788.
us Id. at 788-89.
176 Id. at 792.
177 Id. at 792-93.
1 Id. at 793.
179 See McLean, 283 S.W.3d. at 795-96.
s0 Id. at 792.
181 Id. at 794 (emphasis omitted).
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the settlor, or the beneficiary-and what the intent of the settlor was,
which was not clearly set out in the trust agreement. 18 2 Judge Burrell
also stated that he was not deciding that there was a duty of care and
loyalty that was breached; only that there were material issues of fact
as to the elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and that
McLean should have the opportunity to prove the elements of breach
of fiduciary duty alleged in his petition.1 83
In addressing the causation issue, Judge Burrell concluded
that the trust protector had not presented any uncontroverted facts
that would have established that the beneficiary, as a matter of law,
would have been entitled to a judgment removing the trustee. 18 4 He
also pointed out that "[blecause no legal duties for a trust protector
have been imposed by the Missouri legislature, any such duties may
only arise from the nature of the relationship between the parties or
the language of the trust."' Based on the language of the trust
instrument, Judge Burrell concluded that there could be "an inference
that the Trust Protector could be susceptible to liability for actions
taken in bad faith" if the appellant was able to prove each of the
allegations in the petition.' 86
Each of the other two judges hearing the case wrote a
concurring opinion, reluctantly concurring in the result only.'8 7 The
concurring opinion of Judge Parrish relied solely on the terms of the
trust instrument to ascertain the scope of any duty that might exist
for the trust protector, concluding that "absent the trust protector
doing something in bad faith, he is not liable for his conduct."' 8 8
However, Judge Parrish also determined that since McLean had
alleged in his petition that the trust protector had acted in bad faith,
he raised a factual issue that precluded the granting of a summary
judgment in favor of the trust protector.' 8 9 In her concurring opinion,
Judge Rahmeyer stated that:
I agree that there is no duty as a matter of law as a
'trust protector,' but I do not agree that as a matter of
law the duty of the Trust Protector [in this case] was to
the beneficiary, at least not in the traditional sense,
nor do I equate the right to remove trustees and
appoint successors with a duty to remove trustees and
'8 Id. at 795.
183 id.
184 McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 793.
18s Id. at 794.
'8' Id at 795.
17 See id. at 795-96 (Parrish, J. & Rahmeyer, J., concurring).
188 Id. at 796 (Parrish, J., concurring).
19 McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 796 (Parrish, J., concurring).
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appoint successor trustees.' 9 0
However, Judge Rahmeyer stated that it was not appropriate for the
court to "make up the duties of a trust protector out of whole cloth"
and for this reason held that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on the record before it.'
Since the holding in the case deals solely with whether the
trust protector's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for a motion
for summary judgment, was properly granted by the trial court, the
appellate court's principal concern was whether the allegations in the
scant pleadings before the trial court, if taken as true, could have
formed a sufficient basis for liability.19 2 For that reason, the court's
observations of the powers, duties, and liabilities of trust protectors
must be regarded as dicta.
The case was eventually sent back to the trial court, where the
parties conducted extensive discovery and filed numerous motions. 193
Prior to trial, in the process of ruling on cross motions in limine to
limit expert testimony, the trial court issued an opinion as to the law
applicable to the case. In the order issued, the trial court quoted from
the prior appellate court opinion that "the question of whether a duty
exists is a question of law and, therefore, a question for the court
alone."' 94 The circuit court judge, Michael Pritchett, then indicated to
counsel in granting the motions in limine before him, that he would
not permit expert testimony regarding Ponder's legal duties as trust
protector. 1
In ruling on the pretrial motions, Judge Pritchett stated that
the role of a trust protector is separate and distinct from the role of a
trustee.196 After reviewing the trust provisions concerning the trust
protector and also concerning. the trustee for the McLean Trust, the
trial court ruled that while the trust protector had the authority to
remove a trustee, the trustee was not required to submit any
accountings to the trust protector because the trustee was
independent of the control or supervision of the trust protector and
190 Id. (Rahmeyer, J., concurring).
191 Id.
192 McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 788.
193 Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Ponder, No. 36V010500665-01 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct.
20, 2011).
194 Id. at 1 (quoting RobertT. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Patrick Davis, P.C., 283 S.W.3d
786 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)).
195 Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Ponder, 418 S.W.3d 482, 499 (Mo..Ct. App. 2013),
reh'g and/or transfer denied (Nov. 15, 2013), transfer denied (Feb. 25, 2014).
196 See RobertT. McLean Irrevocable Trustv. Ponder, No. 36V010500665-01, 1 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 20, 2011).
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because the trust protector has no veto power over the conduct of the
trustee.'9 7  The court then ruled that the trust protector had no
obligation to monitor the activities of the trustee, but also declared
that:
[Tihe Trust Protector could [not] simply ignore conduct
of a Trustee which threatened the purposes of the
trust. To the extent that any conduct took place, and
to the extent that the Trust Protector was made aware
of any such conduct, a duty may have arisen by the
Trust Protector in his fiduciary capacity to remove a
trustee."
The case proceeded to trial. The trial commenced on October 25,
2011, and the plaintiff rested on October 28. At that time, the
defendant filed a motion for directed verdict, which the court
sustained.' 99 At the close of the Trust's evidence, the court granted
Ponder's motion for a directed verdict. 20 0 The Trust again appealed to
the Missouri Court of Appeals.2 01
In its appeal, the Trust identified eleven alleged errors on the
part of the trial court that it claimed supported a reversal of the lower
court's judgment. These included:
(1) dismissing claims of Robert individually and Linda
as Trustee, as barred by the statute of limitations, or if
barred, the statute of limitations was tolled due to
Robert's incapacity; (2) failing to articulate the proper
standard of care for fiduciaries; (3) granting Ponder's
motion because the Trust 'presented a submissible
case'; (4) granting Ponder's Motion because the trial
court 'failed to acknowledge [Ponder's] involvement in
the creation and administration of the Trust and their
attorney client relationship'; (5) requiring the Trust to
prove bad faith; (6) excluding expert testimony of
Menees; (7) excluding expert testimony of Bove; (8)
issuing a 'withdrawel [sic] instruction' regarding the
testimony of James McClellan ("McClellan"); (9)
excluding and disregarding testimony of Linda as to
the 'wrongful exclusion of [Robert] from the trust
' See id. at 3.
198 Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Ponder, No. 36V010500665-01, 3 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 20, 2011).
' Id.
200 Id. at 1.
201 Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Ponder, 418 S.W.3d 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013),
reh'g and/or transfer denied (Nov. 15, 2013), transfer denied (Feb. 25, 2014).
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property'; (10) substituting 'its own judgment for that
of the fact finder finding against the weight of the
evidence on facts based on erroneous legal reasoning as
Respondents [sic] affirmative defenses were legally
inapplicable and should have been stricken' [and ample
evidence of damages and causation was submitted to
the court]; and (11) 'entering a judgment for Ponder
because the verdict is only against the weight of the
evidence but as made without the evidence and the
cumulative affect [sic] of the courts [sic] rulings were
against the weight of the evidence and indicate a
judicial bias and deprived [the Trust] of a fair trial.'2 02
The appeals court first considered point ten in which the Trust
alleged that it had presented evidence that the Trust had suffered
economic harm as the result of Ponder's failure to remove the trustee
in December 1999.203 According to the Trust, the Trust eventually lost
more than $500,000 as a direct result of Ponder's failure to remove
the Trustee.204 However, the court concluded that the Trust had
failed to provide any specific evidence of loss to the Trust that could
have been prevented by timely removal of the trustee by Ponder.20 5
Next the court addressed points two through five and
concluded that they were moot since the Trust had failed to prove any
damages attributable to Ponder's action or inaction.20 6 Point one
challenged the trial court's dismissal of certain individual claims of
Robert and Linda McLean.2 0 7 However, the appeals court determined
that neither Robert nor Linda McLean, in their individual capacities,
208had appealed the lower court's decision after the first trial in 2007.
209Therefore, only the Trust remained as a party after that time.
Consequently, the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
McCleans' individual claims.210 The appeals court also rejected the
Trust's contention in points eight and nine that the trial court erred
in refusing to allow testimony regarding Ponder's refusal to allow
Robert McLean permission to return to his residence, which was
owned by the Trust.21 The trial court concluded that testimony about
202 Id. at 488.
203 Id. at 490.
204 id.
205 Id. at 490-96.
206 Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust, 418 S.W.3d at 497.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 498.
209 Id.
210 id.
211 Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust, 418 S.W.3d at 498-99.
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the exclusion of Robert from his residence was not relevant to any
economic damage claim by the Trust.2 12
Points six and seven involved the trial court's exclusion of
expert testimony by Alexander Bove and Hardy Menees proffered by
the Trust regarding Ponder's duties as a trust protector.2 13 The
appeals court rejected the Trust's claim of error by the trial court
because it found that the Trust had simply made a bare assertion that
the trial court erred and failed to provide any factual or legal basis
context for the alleged error.2 14 Finally, the court rejected the Trust's
11th point because it combined allegations of error not related to a
single issue in violation of section 84.04 of the Missouri Rules of
Appellate Procedure.2 15
Unfortunately, this latest development in the McLean saga
sheds very little light on what a trust protector's fiduciary duties
might be. By concluding that the Trust failed to prove that it suffered
any damage as a result of Ponder's failure to remove the trustee, the
court was able to avoid deciding whether Ponder was a fiduciary
(though it implicitly assumed that he was), what the nature of his
duties to the Trust might be, and whether these fiduciary duties, if
any, were inherent in the office of trust protector or whether they
arose solely from the trust instrument. In addition, the court did not
have to decide whether Ponder had a duty to actively oversee or
supervise the actions of the trustee.
D. Conclusion
There is a considerable body of legal authority that indicates
that trust protectors are subject to fiduciary duties. At the very least,
a trust protector must act solely for the benefit of the trust
beneficiaries and cannot use his or her powers for personal benefit. In
other words, a trust protector owes a duty of loyalty to trust
beneficiaries that is similar to that owed by trustees. There is also
legal authority, partly based on decisions involving trust advisors that
dictates that trust protectors be treated as fiduciaries when they
exercise powers that are generally exercised by trustees. On the other
hand, it is less clear whether trust protectors act as fiduciaries when
they exercise powers that are not ordinarily exercised by trustees.
212 Id. at 499.
213 id.
214 Id. at 499-50.
215 Id. at 500.
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III. ANALYSIS
There is no reason why the settlor and a trust protector cannot
agree that the trust protector will be subject to certain fiduciary
duties. A more difficult issue is whether trust protectors should be
subject to fiduciary duties in the absence of such an agreement. As
mentioned earlier, trustees are subject to a number of fiduciary
duties, such as loyalty, prudence, and impartiality under ordinar
principles of trust law, even in the absence of an express agreement.2
Are trust protectors any different? In order to determine whether any
fiduciary duties should be imposed on trust protectors, it is necessary
to consider a number of questions. First, should courts or legislatures
impose any fiduciary duties on trust protectors at all? Second, if so,
should trust protectors be subject to certain minimum standards of
conduct in the exercise of all of their powers and functions or only in
the exercise of some of them? Third, if a trust protector is a fiduciary,
what minimum standards of conduct should be applicable to his
conduct? Fourth, should a higher standard of conduct be applied to
certain powers exercised by trust protectors? Fifth, to what extent
should the settlor be allowed to increase or waive the default standard
of conduct? Sixth, who would have standing to sue a trust protector
for breach of fiduciary duty? Finally, what sanctions should be
imposed on a trust protector for breach of a fiduciary duty?
A. Is a Trust Protector Ever a Fiduciary?
A strong case can be made that trust protectors should be
considered fiduciaries, at least for some purposes. First of all, there is
considerable authority in foreign jurisdictions for this position and the
reasoning of these cases is quite persuasive. For example, in the
211Skeats' Settlement case,21 the English Chancery Court concluded that
there must be some limit on the exercise of power by a trust protector
or else he would be free to personally profit from the exercise of that
power at the expense of the trust beneficiaries.218 Thus, if a trust
protector who was given the power to appoint and remove trustees
was free to sell that office to the highest bidder or to receive a share of
the trustee's compensation, a trustee who was appointed in this
manner, would not be expected to act in the best interests of the
beneficiaries.
A similar theme runs through some of the other cases
discussed in Part II. For example, in the Von Knieriem case, the
Bermuda High Court agreed with the reasoning of Skeats that a trust
216 See sup ra, Part II.A.
217 See Skeats v. Evans, 42 Ch. D. 522 (1889).
21 Id. at 526.
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protector was a fiduciary, at least for some purposes, because he could
not exercise the power to appoint and replace trustees for his own
benefit.219 Also, in Centre Trustees (C.I.) Ltd. & Langry Trust Co.
(C.L) Ltd. v. Pabst, the Royal Court of the Island of Jersey held that
even though the trust protector was not obliged to exercise certain
powers under the trust, the powers were still fiduciary in nature
because if he did exercise them, he must do so on behalf of the
beneficiaries of the trust.2 2 0
There is statutory support for this position as well. Section
808 of the Uniform Probate Code declares that one who holds a power
to direct (such as a trust advisor or trust protector), is presumptively
a fiduciary.22 ' Other statutes are even more explicit. For example,
222 221224statutes in Delaware,2 2 2 New Hampshire,22 3 Iinois,24 Michigan,2 2 5
Wyoming, 22 6 and Missouri2 27 provide that trust protectors will be
treated as fiduciaries, at least in some circumstances. Finally, there
is considerable authority for the proposition that trust advisors have
traditionally been held to fiduciary standards. Since there is
considerable overlap between the role of trust advisors and trust
protectors, arguably the latter group should be treated as fiduciaries
when they exercise similar powers.
However, some jurisdictions leave it entirely up to the settlor
to determine what, if any, fiduciary duties should be imposed on a
trust protector. This view is reflected in statutes that have been
enacted in Alaska,22 9 Arizona,23 0 Idaho,2 3 1 and South Dakota.232 These
statutes declare that a trust protector will not be treated as a
fiduciary unless the trust instrument so provides. This approach
seems to have originated in the laws of foreign jurisdictions governing
offshore asset protection trusts that been imported into some
American trust protector statutes.23 3 Considering that American trust
219 See Jurgen Von Knieriem, supra note 105; Skeats, 42 Ch. D. 522.
220 See Centre Trustees (C.I.) Ltd. & Langry Trust Co. (C.I.) Ltd. v. Pabst, 2009 JLR 202
(Royal Ct. of Jersey, June 2, 2009).
221 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-808 (1969) (amended 2010).
222 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2011).
223 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1202(a) (2008).
224 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3 (2013).
225 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7809 (2010).
226 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-711 (2003).
227 Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.8-808 (2012).
228 See Bove, supra note 31, at 51.
229 ALASKA STAT. 13.36.370(b) (2013).
230 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10818(D) (2013).
231 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501(6) (2007).
232 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-1 (2011).
233 See Bove, supra note 31, at 53.
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protectors typically have greater powers and duties than their
overseas counterparts, the better view seems to be that they should be
presumptively considered fiduciaries.
B. Should Trust Protectors Be Held to Minimum Standards
of Conduct for All of Their Actions?
As mentioned earlier, there is some statutory support for the
proposition that trust protectors should be treated as fiduciaries for
234all purposes. For example, statutes in Delaware, New
Hampshire,2 3 5 Illinois,"' Michigan,2 37 Wyoming,23 and Missouri
provide that trust protectors will be treated as fiduciaries when
exercising their powers under the trust instrument unless the settlor
provides otherwise. On the other hand, several court decisions from
foreign jurisdictions have ruled that trust protectors may be treated
as fiduciaries for some purposes, but not necessarily for other
240
purposes.
There are several potential exceptions to the application of
general standards of conduct to trust protectors. For example, several
statutes,241 as well as the Uniform Trust Code, 24 2 exempt trust
protectors who are also trust beneficiaries from the fiduciary duties
that apply to other trust protectors. The comment to section 808 of
the UTC suggests that this exemption is primarily applicable to self-
directed accounts such as employee benefit plans and individual
retirement accounts. 2 4 3 Clearly, there is no need to impose a fiduciary
duty in a case where the sole beneficiary of a trust has the power to
direct how the trust assets are invested or distributed. On the other
hand, if a trust protector is only one of several beneficiaries, it seems
that he should be subject to minimal fiduciary duties just as a trustee
or trust advisor would be who was also one of the trust beneficiaries.
Another issue is whether a trust protector should be held to a
fiduciary standard only when he acts affirmatively. The Royal court
244of Jersey recently made this distinction in the Centre Trustees case.
234 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2011).
235 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1202(a) (2008).
236 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3 (2013).
237 MICH. COMP. LAws § 700.7809 (2010).
238 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-711 (2003).
239 Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.8-808 (2012).
240 See Jurgen Von Knieriem, supra note 105, at 118-19; Skeats v. Evans, 42 Ch. D. 522,
526 (1889).
241 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10818(A) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1202(a)
(2008).
242 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d) (2000) (amended 2010).
243 Id. § 808, cmt.
244 See Centre Trustees (C.I.) Ltd. & Langry Trust Co. (C.I.) Ltd. v. Pabst, 2009 JLR 202
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In that case, the trust instrument declared that the powers vested in
the trust protector were not held in a fiduciary capacity.245 However,
the court interpreted this to mean that the trust protector was not
obliged to exercise them.24 Although it is a close call, the better
approach is to impose the minimum standards described above on
decisions not to exercise a particular power. It is hard to justify a rule
that would protect a trust protector from liability who refused to act
solely from improper motives.
C. What Should These Minimum Standards of Conduct Be?
Assuming that trust protectors can be fiduciaries, at least in
some circumstances, the next question is whether any minimum
standards of conduct should be imposed, either by statute or by
judicial decision, that would be applicable to all activities and
functions of a trust protector (unless a higher standard of conduct is
otherwise applicable). I believe that trust protectors should be subject
to certain standards of conduct that reflect the fundamental principle
that a fiduciary should not act to benefit himself, but rather he should
act solely to advance or protect the interests of the trust beneficiaries.
In addition, trust protectors should be expected to carry out the
objectives of the trust and should not violate any of its express
provisions. A trust protector should also be required to act in good
faith and not out of spite, malice, or other improper motive. Finally, a
trust protector should exercise independent judgment in the exercise
of his powers. All of these moral imperatives can be captured in a
formulation that is set forth in several state statutes, namely that a
trust protector act in good faith and exercise independent judgment in
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests
of the beneficiaries.2 47 I will henceforth refer to this formulation as
the "good faith" standard.
The duty to act in accordance with the terms and purposes of
the trust is embodied in the duty of loyalty. It requires a trust
protector to faithfully carry out the intent of the settlor as set forth in
the trust instrument.248  Where appropriate, the grantor's written
instructions may be supplemented by any personal knowledge that
the trust protector may have of the grantor's wishes and objectives as
long as they do not directly contradict the terms of the trust. The
duty to act solely in the best interests of the trust beneficiaries also
(Royal Ct. of Jersey, June 2, 2009).
245 See id.
246 See id.
247 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7809 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:12-1202(a)
(2008).
248 See Hill, supra note 44, at 832.
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involves the duty of loyalty. 249 Like trustees, trust protectors must
act to further the best interests of the trust beneficiaries and must
treat each beneficiary fairly.
The duty to act in good faith is somewhat more elusive. As the
court in Hartman v. Baker250 pointed out, "good faith" is "[a] state of
mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to
one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of
intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage."2 51 When
applied to trust protectors, the concept of good faith would require a
trust protector to carry out his duties honestly and competently and
not act out of greed, malice, or some other improper motive.
Arguably, a requirement that a trust protector exercise
independent judgment is implicit in the duty of loyalty and good faith.
However, a recent experience suggests that the obligation to exercise
independent judgment should be set forth as an independent fiduciary
duty. Recently, I was asked to advise counsel for a trust beneficiary
in a case where the trustee of an inter vivos trust had been given the
power by the settlor to appoint or remove the trust protector. The
trustee, who was a beneficiary, was engaged in a long-running dispute
with some of the other trust beneficiaries. The trust protector had the
power to modify the terms of the trust but no trust protector had been
appointed when the trust was created. However, sometime later, the
trustee appointed a business associate as trust protector. The next
day, the trust protector modified the trust instrument by inserting an
in terrorem clause purporting to terminate the beneficial interest of
any beneficiary who challenged the conduct of the trustee in court.
The trust protector also added a provision to the trust instrument
that purported to exonerate both the trustee and the trust protector
from liability for any breach of trust. These provisions had been
drafted by the trustee's counsel, not by the trust protector.
Immediately after the trust instrument was changed, the trustee
removed the trust protector. It appears that in this case, the trust
protector did not exercise independent judgment when he exercised
his power to modify the terms of the trust, but rather acted as an
agent of the trustee. The facts of this case suggest that an explicit
requirement that the trust protector exercise independent judgment
ought to be included in any formula that purports to identify a trust
protector's minimum standard of conduct.
The standards that I have proposed seem particularly
249 id.
250 Hartman v. Baker, 766 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
251 Id. at 355 n. 3.
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appropriate to individual trust protectors who are relatives or friends
of the settlor and serve for little or no compensation. Should
"professionals" who serve as trust protectors (assuming there are any)
be held to higher standards of conduct? The Restatement of Trusts
declares that if a "trustee possesses, or procured appointment by
purporting to possess, special facilities or greater skill than that of a
person of ordinar2 prudence, the trustee has a duty to use such
facilities or skill." 52 Under these limited circumstances, it seems
proper to hold a trust protector to a higher standard of skill and
competence, particularly where he has the power to direct the
management and investment of trust property.
D. Should a Higher Standard of Conduct Be Applied to Some
of the Powers Exercised by Trust Protectors?
Trust protectors can be appointed to perform a variety of
tasks.25 3 However, most of these powers fall into one of four basic
categories: (1) providing advice to trustees; (2) overseeing the
activities of trustees; (3) resolving or mediating disputes; and (4)
modifying or terminating the trust.2 54 These powers are different in
nature and, therefore, different standards of conduct could logically be
applied to their exercise.
1. Advising the Trustee
The trust instrument may authorize a trust protector to advise
the trustee on various matters of trust administration. This power
should be distinguished from the power to direct, where the trustee is
required to follow the trust protector's directions. This advisory
power could extend to a variety of issues, including investment
decisions, discretionary distributions, or when and how to provide
financial information to qualified beneficiaries. Obviously, some of
the advice provided by the trust protector may require financial or
legal expertise on the part of the trust protector, while other advice
may be based on personal knowledge of the beneficiaries and their
circumstances. In the former case, one could argue that a trust
protector be held to a professional standard of care. Otherwise, a
"good faith" standard seems appropriate.
2. Supervising the Activities of the Trustee or Exercising
Trustee Powers
Overseeing the conduct of the trustee was one of the major
functions of trust protectors during the early days of offshore asset
252 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(3) (2007); see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 806 (2000)
(amended 2010).
253 Ruce, supra note 20, at 74.
254 See Ausness, supra note 40, at 329.
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protection trusts. Although it is less likely that a trust protector will
be expected to act as a watchdog in the case of domestic trusts, there
are some commonly held powers that are essentially supervisory in
character. For example, the trust instrument may authorize the trust
protector to review and approve the accountings of a trustee. In
addition, it should allow the trust protector to direct, consent, or veto
a trustee's action or inaction in making distributions to trust
beneficiaries. Perhaps most significant of these supervisory powers is
the power to appoint or remove trustees or successor trustees.
Because these are discretionary powers, a "good faith" standard
should be sufficient to protect the interests of the trust beneficiaries.
3. Resolving or Mediating Disputes
It is sometimes useful to empower the trust protector to
interpret the terms of the trust instrument at the request of either the
trustee or the beneficiaries. Depending on the terms of the trust
instrument, the trust protector's interpretation can be either binding
or advisory. The advantage of vesting this power in a trust protector
is that it may enable the trust to avoid having to resolve disputes that
would otherwise have to be decided by litigation.2 55 A trust protector
can also act as a mediator between the trustee and the trust
beneficiaries when disputes arise between or among them.25 6 Once
again, due to the discretionary nature of these powers, a "good faith"
standard seems best suited to the exercise of these powers.
4. Modifying or Terminating the Trust
One method of achieving flexibility with respect to
"irrevocable" trusts is to empower a trust protector to modify either
administrative or substantive provisions of the trust. The power to
amend administrative provisions is often limited to specific situations,
such as changing the provisions of the trust to achieve a more
favorable tax status or to take advantages of changes in the law of
property, trusts, or trust administration. In addition, the trust
instrument may empower the trust protector to modify the trust's
administrative provisions, including changing the governing law of
the trust or moving the situs of the trust to another state.
In addition, the trust instrument may authorize the trust
protector to modify the substantive provisions of the trust. This
power may include the right to increase or decrease the interest of
any trust beneficiary, the right to grant a power of appointment to a
trust beneficiary or to terminate or amend a power of appointment, to
255 See Jeffrey Evans Stake, A Brief Comment on Trust Protectors, 27 CARDOzO L. REV.
2813, 2814-15 (2006).
256 Ruce, supra note 20, at 72.
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convert the trust to a spendthrift trust, or the right to terminate the
trust and distribute the trust corpus to the beneficiaries. Although
the trustee or the beneficiaries can petition a court to change the
terms of the trust, judicial reformation can be expensive.25 7 Vesting
this power in a trust protector can avoid much of this expense. In
some cases, the exercise of these powers might require expertise as,
for example, modifying trust provisions to take advantage of changes
in the tax law or transferring the situs of the trust to another state.
In such cases, it might be desirable to hold the trust protector to a
professional standard of care if he is a professional. However, for
discretionary acts that do not require such expertise, the "good faith"
standard, once again, seems to be appropriate.
To conclude, a strong argument can be made that a trust
protector's fiduciary standard of conduct should vary according to the
function or power being exercised. Thus, one can argue that a trust
protector who provides professional advice on legal or financial
matters should be held to a professional standard of care. Likewise,
when a trust protector exercises powers that would ordinarily be
reserved to a trustee, it seems reasonable to impose the same
fiduciary standards on the trust protector that would be imposed by
law on a trustee. However, for discretionary acts, a "good faith"
standard is the best approach.
E. Modification of Minimum Fiduciary Duties in the Trust
Instrument
I have concluded that trust protectors should be subject to a
legislatively or judicially imposed minimum standard of conduct. At
the same time, settlors should be free to impose higher standards in
connection with the exercise of certain powers if they choose.
However, should settlors also be able to relieve a trust protector of all
fiduciary duties? Presumably, they could do so by specifying that
some or all of the powers authorized in the trust instrument are
deemed to be personal and not held in trust.2 5 8 If a trust protector's
power is personal in nature, the power is purely discretionary and an
"individual holding a personal power cannot be forced to exercise it
and in fact need not even consider whether to exercise it. And if he
does exercise such a power, he may do so on a whim, or even for a
spiteful or malicious reason, so long as he does not commit a fraud on
the power."25 9 However, it is difficult to conclude that a rational
settlor would want to confer this sort of power on a disinterested third
257 Id. at 70.
258 Id. at 80-81.
259 Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Trust Protector: Trust(y) Watchdog or Expensive Exotic Pet?,
30 EST. PLAN. 390, 391 (2003) [hereinafter "Trust(y) Watchdog"].
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party. On the other hand, if a settlor wishes to give an unfettered
power to a child or spouse, it might be better (tax considerations
aside) to transfer the power to the person outright instead of
appointing him or her to be a trust protector.
F. Sanctions for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
What sort of sanctions should a court impose on a trust
protector who has breached a fiduciary duty? Presumably, the same
remedies that are available for breach of fiduciary duty by a trustee
would also be available where a trust protector breached a fiduciary
duty. For example, a court could order a trust protector to carry out a
duty or exercise a power if it were mandatory in nature. A court could
also reverse an action by a trust protector that violates a fiduciary
duty and order him to return matters to the status quo ante. In
addition, a court could remove a trust protector if the breach is
flagrant or prolonged. Finally, a court might award damages if the
trust protector's breach of fiduciary duty results in a financial loss to
the trust or its beneficiaries.
In most cases, the trust beneficiaries would have standing to
bring an action against the trust protector for breach of fiduciary
duty. 6 0 It is also possible that the trustee would be able to proceed
against a trust protector for breach of fiduciary duty if the
beneficiaries fail to act.2 6 1 Finally, a settlor who is still alive and has
retained an interest in the trust may also have standing to sue the
trust protector for breach of trust.
IV. DRAFTING ADVICE
Because the nature, and in some cases even the very existence,
of a trust protector's fiduciary duties may not be clearly addressed by
statute or judicial decision, it is essential to consider this issue fully in
the trust instrument. In particular, the drafter should: (1) enumerate
each of the trust protector's powers and responsibilities; (2) identify
the applicable standards of conduct; (3) provide for the appointment,
removal, and compensation of trust protectors; and (4) consider
whether to include an exculpatory clause in the trust instrument.
A. Enumerate Each of the Trust Protector's Powers and
Responsibilities
Unlike trustees, trust protectors appear to have no inherent or
implied powers. In some states, the powers of a trust protector are set
forth (usually on a non-exclusive basis) by statute. However, even in
260 See Bove, supra note 31, at 52.
261 id.
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those states, it is good practice to identify in the trust instrument the
specific powers that the settlor wants the trust protector to have.
That way, the trust protector will only be allowed to exercise the
powers that are necessary to carry out the objectives of the trust. In
addition to enumerating specific powers, the drafter should consider
requiring the trustee to provide the trust protector, when necessary,
with periodic reports regarding the administration of the trust, as
well as access to accounting and tax information.26 2
Another consideration is whether to grant a particular power
to the trust protector without any conditions or limitations, or
whether to limit the exercise of a power to a special set of
circumstances. Limiting the exercise of a particular power provides
greater protection against abuse of power by the trust protector.
However, it also increases the chances that a beneficiary may claim
that the trust protector exceeded his authority under the terms of the
trust. It goes without saying that it is essential for the drafter explain
to the settlor the costs and benefits of various alternatives and to
work closely with the settlor to ensure that the trust instrument fully
and accurately reflects the settlor's objectives.
Finally, in addition to identifying the trust protector's powers
and duties, the drafter should specify which powers, if any, are to be
considered personal in nature and which are considered to be held in
trust. As discussed earlier, personal powers are not fiduciary in
nature. In such cases, the only limitation on the exercise of a
personal power is that the donee of the power cannot act in a way that
constitutes a fraud on the power.2 63
B. Identify the Applicable Standards of Conduct
Even if an applicable statute declares that a trust protector is
a fiduciary, it is still desirable for the trust instrument to declare
when (or if) the trust protector is a fiduciary and to specify what
standard of conduct is applicable.2 64 As suggested earlier, an
appropriate formula would provide that the trust protector in the
exercise (or non-exercise) of his powers is required to act in good faith,
in accordance with the terms of the trust, in and the interests of the
beneficiaries, and exercise independent judgment when carrying out
his duties. These four requirements reflect the essence of a fiduciary
relationship. They are suitable standards of conduct for most of the
powers that a trust protector is likely to exercise and they are
262 See Carla S. Ranum & Elizabeth L. Mathieu, Trust Protectors-A Pandora's Box?, 55
ADVOCATE 36, 38 (Aug. 2012).
263 See Trust(y) Watchdog, supra note 259, at 391.
264 Charles D. Fox IV, How 'Revocable" Is 'Trrevocable'? Obtaining Flexibility in
Irrevocable Trusts, 33 Om1o N.U.L. REV. 943, 956 (2007).
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particularly appropriate for powers that require the trust protector to
exercise discretion.
However, if a trust protector is expected to offer professional
advice on legal or financial matters in addition to performing other
functions, the settlor might wish to hold him to a professional
standard of conduct.2 65  This practice is increasingly common with
trustees and other specially skilled fiduciaries.2 66 Alternatively, the
settlor may wish to hold the trust protector to the same standard of
conduct that applies to trustees when he exercises powers that are
normally reserved to a trustee. In such cases, the drafter should
identify these powers in the trust instrument and indicate what
standard of conduct will be applicable.
B. Provide for the Appointment, Removal, and
Compensation of Trust Protectors
The trust instrument should provide some mechanism for the
appointment, removal, and compensation of trust protectors. This is
especially important if the trust is expected to last for a long time.
Although the appointment, removal, and compensation process does
not have a direct bearing on a trust protector's fiduciary duties, it may
affect them indirectly. In most instances, the settlor will appoint the
original trust protector in the deed of trust, if the trust is inter vivos,
or by will, if the trust is testamentary. However, assuming that the
trust protector is an individual, it may become necessary to appoint a
successor if the original trust protector dies, becomes incapacitated or
is removed for some reason. The trust instrument should provide a
26mechanism for appointing a .successor trust protector.267 If the trust is
inter vivos, the settlor might retain that power. However, if the
settlor is dead the power to appoint a successor trust protector should
be vested in someone. Otherwise, the trustee or the beneficiaries will
268have to petition a court to appoint one.
Allowing the trustee to appoint a successor trust protector is
one option.269 This approach might compromise the ability of the
appointee to act independently of the trustee. A better alternative
might be to vest this power in one or more beneficiaries. 27 0 However,
this approach threatens to undermine the successor trust protector's
duty of independence. Another approach is to empower the trustee
265 See Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 33, at 790-91.
266 id.
267 Fox, supra note 264, at 957.
268 Gregory T. Densen, Trust Protectors: Powers, Capacity, and Selection, 41 COLO. LAW. 63,
67 (Sept. 2012).
269 id.
270 id.
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and some or all of the beneficiaries to fill a vacancy when it occurs.27 1
Of course, the disadvantage of this approach is that it results in an
unwieldy combination of participants. Finally, the trust instrument
could authorize a disinterested third party to appoint a successor
trust protector, but then it would have to provide for a mechanism to
replace the appointer if he or she died or became disabled.
Some of these problems can be avoided if the settlor appoints a
bank or other corporate financial institution to serve as trust
protector. Unlike private individuals, corporate entities do not die or
become disabled.2 72 Of course, they are many reasons for the settlor to
choose an individual as trust protector instead of a corporate entity.
First, an institutional trust protector, like an institutional trustee,
will insist on being compensated, thereby increasing the cost of
administering the trust. Second, some of the activities that a trust
protector is expected to carry out may require personal knowledge of
the beneficiaries and their personalities and financial circumstances.
In such cases, it would be better to choose a family member instead.
On the other hand, a corporate entity might be more suitable if the
trust protector's principal responsibility is to provide legal or financial
advice to the trustee. However, if that were the case, it would
probably be better to avoid appointing a trust protector and instead
authorize the trustee to hire an attorney or financial advisor for this
purpose.
Removal presents problems as well. As mentioned earlier, a
court can remove a trust protector for breach of trust. However,
judicial proceedings are expensive, especially if they are contested. As
with the appointment process, there are no good methods for
removing a trust protector. It would not be wise to vest this power in
the trustee because that might impair the trust protector's
independence. The same is possible if the power to remove is vested
in one or more beneficiaries, particularly if the trust protector has the
power to modify the distributive provisions of the trust. Of course, the
settlor could retain the power to remove the trust protector, but that
is not a long-term solution to the problem.
Another aspect of the power to remove is whether the trust
protector should be subject to removal only for cause. Removal for
cause should be limited to incompetence, incapacity, or serious
breaches of trust. On the other hand, if someone is given absolute
discretion to remove the trust protector (other than a sole
beneficiary), there is a danger that the trust protector would not be
able to exercise independent judgment and would become little more
271 Id
272 Langbein, supra note 48, at 639.
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than an agent of the person who had the power of removal.
The issue of compensation is often overlooked. Obviously, an
institutional or professional trust protector will insist on being
compensated. It is also good practice to compensate individual trust
protectors, even if they are friends or family members, at least on a
per diem basis for their time and expenses. The question is who
should negotiate compensation issues with the trust protector? It is
obvious that the trust protector cannot unilaterally determine his
compensation. That would constitute a conflict of interest and might
even result in self-dealing. The parties would also have a conflict of
interest if the trustee determined the trust protector's compensation,
assuming that the trust protector exercised supervisory powers over
the trustee. In theory, the trustee could approve a generous
compensation package in return for the trust protector tacitly
agreeing not to oppose the trustee's decisions.
It appears that the only persons without a conflict of interest
would be the settlor and the trust beneficiaries. The settlor would be
in a good position to determine the trust protector's compensation if
he or she was still alive and willing to do so. The settlor might also
devise some sort of compensation formula based on objective criteria,
such as the size of the trust corpus or a percentage of the trust
income. Another approach would be to allow the trustee to negotiate
the trust protector's compensation subject to approval by the
beneficiaries.
Another issue is reimbursement for reasonable expenses that
a trust protector incurred in carrying out his duties. The trust
instrument should provide for the payment of travel and related
expenses, as well as the cost of obtaining expert legal, financial, or
other professional advice where needed.2 73
C. Consider Whether to Include an Exculpatory Clause in
the Trust Instrument
Exculpatory clauses in trusts are designed to relieve
fiduciaries of liability for certain acts or failures to act that might
otherwise be considered negligence or a breach of trust. They are
widely used in such instruments for both amateur and professional
214
fiduciaries. Both the Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 222
and the UTC section 1008 provide that exculpatory clauses are
generally enforceable. 275 However, both declare that such clauses are
273 See generally Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 33, at 792.
274 Hill, supra note 44, at 834.
275 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 (2000)
(amended 2010).
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unenforceable if inserting such a clause into a trust instrument is
itself a breach of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, both also state that
exculpatory clauses are to be strictly construed and limit their
effectiveness in cases of bad faith, intentional misconduct, or reckless
indifference.
Although the Uniform Trust Code recognizes that exculpatory
clauses are generally enforceable, it also sets forth a number of
"mandatory rules" that cannot be waived by the settlor.276  For
example, section 105(b)(2) declares that "the duty of a trustee to act in
good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust"
is a mandatory rule.277 In addition, section 105(b)(3) states that "the
requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its
beneficiaries" cannot be waived.278 Furthermore, section 1008
declares that:
(a) A term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for
breach of trust is unenforceable to the extent that it:
(1) relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust
committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to
the purposes of the trust or the interests of the
beneficiaries; or (2) was inserted as the result of an
abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship to the settlor.2 79
(b) An exculpatory term drafted or caused to be drafted
by the trustee is invalid as an abuse of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship unless the trustee proves that
the exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances
and that its existence and contents were adequately
communicated to the settlor.2 80
Presumably, these principles would also apply to trust
protectors insofar as the exercise of a fiduciary power is concerned.
The primary purpose of an exculpatory clause is to discourage
lawsuits against the trust protector by providing almost complete
immunity from liability. However, the drafter must be careful to
make sure that the exculpatory clause is consistent with the
standards of conduct that have been imposed on the trust protector
elsewhere in the trust instrument.
V. CONCLUSION
276 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(1)(4) (2000) (amended 2010).
277 Id. § 105(b)(2).
278 Id. § 105(b)(3).
279 Id. § 1008(a).
280 Id. § 1008(b).
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Trust protectors are a relatively new addition to American
trust law. Because of their extreme versatility, trust protectors can
be used in a number of ways to assist in the administration of private
trusts. Trust protectors are now recognized in most states, largely
due to the widespread adoption of the Uniform Trust Code.
Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty about the
powers and duties of trust protectors. One of the most troublesome
areas of uncertainty is whether or when trust protectors should be
considered fiduciaries.
In this Article, I have attempted to identify the standards of
conduct that should apply to trust protectors. American cases
involving trust advisors and decisions from foreign jurisdictions
involving trust protectors provide support for the notion that trust
protectors should be considered fiduciaries, at least for some purposes.
The Uniform Trust Code and statutes from a number of American
states also provide that trust protectors are subject to some fiduciary
duties. I have concluded that the weight of authority, foreign and
domestic, suggests that trust protectors should be required to act in
good faith, adhere to the terms of the trust instrument, and exercise
their powers in the best interest of the trust beneficiaries. I would
add an additional requirement that a trust protector exercise
independent judgment in carrying out the functions of his office.
These standards are particularly appropriate when the trust protector
exercises discretionary powers. Finally, the trust instrument can also
hold trust protectors to a higher standard, especially when the trust
protector is providing services of a professional nature.
At the same time, if the settlor so desires, the trust
instrument may designate some of the powers granted to the trust
protector as personal and not fiduciary in nature and thereby exempt
them from any fiduciary standard of conduct. The settlor can also
modify the default standard of conduct by inserting an exculpatory
clause in the trust instrument. The lesson to be learned from this is
that while a great deal of uncertainty still exists about trust
protectors and the standards of conduct to which they are subject,
much of this uncertainty can be reduced by the insertion of
appropriate provisions in the trust instrument.
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